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ENSURING THE CONSTITUTION REMAINS 
COLOR BLIND VS. TURNING A BLIND EYE TO 
JUSTICE: EQUAL PROTECTION AND 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN UNIVERSITY 
ADMISSIONS 
Attashin Safari* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On university campuses across the country, students come 
together to take part in a global exchange of ideas and experiences. 
The fusion of diverse perspectives enriches the campus community 
and contributes to the learning experience of each student. As students 
compete to gain acceptance into universities, many schools experience 
an influx in applications.1 The increase in admission applications has 
led to lower acceptance rates at many schools.2 Across the nation, 
prospective applicants hope that all students start off on a level playing 
field in the eyes of the admissions committee—leaving it up to their 
achievements and accomplishments to determine their fate. However, 
more and more universities are looking beyond grades and scholastic 
achievements when aiming to select a diverse student body.3 
Yet the notion that an immutable characteristic such as race may 
affect university admissions might be perceived as being 
counterintuitive to the notion of fairness between all applicants. This 
is the sentiment that drove Abigail Fisher (“Fisher”), an applicant 
 
 * J.D., cum laude, 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Order of the Coif; B.A., cum 
laude, 2011, University of California at San Diego. Thank you to Professor Kimberly West-Faulcon 
for her invaluable guidance, and Professor Laurie Levenson for her support.    
 1. Lindsey Cook, Is the College Admissions Bubble About to Burst?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (Sept. 22, 2014, 9:48 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/09/22/is-the-
college-admissions-bubble-about-to-burst(“Met with an influx in applications, selective colleges 
have refined the way they look at students.”). 
 2. Id. (“The increase in students and applications continue to push acceptance rates lower 
and lower.”). 
 3. See Juju Chang, Good Grades, Extracurriculars, May Not Be All Colleges Look For 
Anymore, ABC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2016, 11:30 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/good-grades-
extracurriculars-colleges-anymore/story?id=36429888. 
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denied admission to the University of Texas at Austin (“University”), 
to sue the University, alleging that the University’s consideration of 
race in its admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Constitution.4 
Fisher’s legal team sought to make her a living symbol of the 
alleged unfair racial victimization faced by Caucasians in present day 
society.5 Fisher’s narrative depicted a young woman who seemingly 
did everything right—worked hard in school, attained high grades, and 
participated in extracurricular activities,6 but nevertheless was rejected 
from a university that denied her admittance due to the color of her 
skin.7 However, the Supreme Court upheld the University’s race-
conscious admissions policy as constitutional because it was narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest and thus survived strict 
scrutiny.8 
This Comment will argue that the holding in Fisher II is narrower 
than initially perceived, leaving the door open to future challenges. 
Part II of this Comment delineates Fisher’s journey up to the Supreme 
Court and discusses the reasoning of the Court in holding that the race-
conscious admission policy employed by the University is 
constitutional. Part III of this Comment examines the ramifications of 
Fisher II with regard to affirmative action as applied in university 
admissions and the possibility of future challenges to race-conscious 
admissions policies. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  The University of Texas at Austin’s Admission Policy 
The University’s admission policy has shifted over the course of 
two decades.9 Prior to 1997, the University considered two factors, “a 
 
 4. See Nikole-Hannah Jones, What Abigail Fisher’s Affirmative Action Case Was Really 
About, PROPUBLICA (June 23, 2016, 12:28 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/a-colorblind-
constitution-what-abigail-fishers-affirmative-action-case-is-r. (“There were people in my class 
with lower grades who weren’t in all the activities I was in, who were being accepted into UT, and 
the only other difference between us was the color of our skin . . . I was taught from the time I was 
a little girl that any kind of discrimination was wrong. And for an institution of higher learning to 
act this way makes no sense to me. What kind of example does it set for others?”). 
 5. See id.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. (“But she was cheated, they say, her dream snatched away by a university that closed 
its doors to her because she had been born the wrong color: White.”). 
 8. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214–15 (2016). 
 9. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013). 
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numerical score reflecting an applicant’s test scores and academic 
performance in high school” and the race of the applicant.10 During 
this time, the consideration of the race of the applicant was a separate 
and distinct factor in the University’s admissions policy. However, in 
1996 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in 
Hopwood v. Texas11 that the consideration of race employed by the 
University violated the Equal Protection Clause.12 The Court of 
Appeals held that the University’s race-conscious admissions policy 
did not serve to further a compelling government interest.13 Following 
Hopwood, the University changed its admissions policy and adopted 
a new program to comply with the decision.14 
The University continued to take into consideration a numerical 
score (hereinafter “Academic Index”) that reflected the applicant’s 
academic performance in high school as well as the applicant’s various 
test scores.15 However, rather than considering race in its admissions 
policy, the University instead created a second factor referred to as the 
“Personal Achievement Index.”16 The Personal Achievement Index is 
a holistic metric of a candidate’s potential contribution to the 
University.17 The University uses this metric in conjunction with the 
applicant’s Academic Index.18 The Personal Achievement Index 
“measures a student’s leadership and work experience, awards, 
extracurricular activities, community service, and other special 
circumstances that give insight into a student’s background.”19 
In 1997, the Texas State Legislature enacted a statute that grants 
“automatic admission to any public state college, including the 
University, to all students in the top 10% of their class at high schools 
in Texas that comply with certain standards”(hereinafter “Top Ten 
Percent Law”).20 The enactment of the Top Ten Percent Law affected 
the University substantially, as approximately 75% of the incoming 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 12. Id. at 962. 
 13. Id. at 955. 
 14. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2415. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 2415–16. Such circumstances include “growing up in a single-parent home, speaking 
a language other than English at home, significant family responsibilities assumed by the applicant, 
and the general socioeconomic condition of the student’s family.” Id. at 2416. 
 20. Id. at 2416; see TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (2009). 
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class is comprised of students granted admission through this means 
as opposed to the traditional application process.21 Approximately 
25% of the incoming freshman class is still subject to the University’s 
admissions policy.22 
In 2004, the University created a “Proposal to Consider Race and 
Ethnicity in Admissions” (“Proposal”).23 “The Proposal concluded 
that the University lacked a ‘critical mass’ of minority students and 
that to remedy the deficiency it was necessary to give explicit 
consideration to race in the undergraduate admissions program.”24 
Beginning with applicants in the fall of 2004, the University updated 
its admission policy to include an applicant’s race as a component of 
the student’s Personal Achievement Index score.25 Although the 
University’s application process is explicitly race-conscious, race is 
not “assigned an explicit numerical value,” though it is “undisputed 
that race is a meaningful factor.”26 
After applicants are assigned scores for their Academic Index and 
their Personal Achievement Index, applicants are placed on a grid in 
which the Personal Achievement Index is the y-axis and the Academic 
Index constitutes the x-axis.27 Students with individual scores that fall 
above a certain line are admitted.28 
B.  Procedural History 
1.  Fisher’s First Journey to the Supreme Court 
Fisher’s first journey to the Supreme Court was in 2013, in Fisher 
I.29 In 2008, plaintiff Fisher, who is Caucasian, sought admission to 
the University’s entering class.30 After being rejected admission to the 
University, she sued the University and various University officials, 
alleging that the University’s consideration of race in its admissions 
 
 21. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206 (2016). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 2415. 
 30. Id. at 2417. 
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policy was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.31 
The District Court granted summary judgment to the University, 
and upheld the University’s admissions plan.32 The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed, however, the court did not perform a searching examination 
of the admissions policy, but rather held that Fisher could challenge 
only whether the University’s use of race as a factor in the admissions 
process was made in good faith.33 In addition, the Fifth Circuit gave 
substantial deference to the University, both in terms of the 
“compelling interest in diversity” and in its conclusion regarding 
whether the University’s “specific plan was narrowly tailored to 
achieve its stated goal.”34 
However, when the case reached the Supreme Court, the 
reasoning of the lower courts was not adopted.35 The Court held that 
in order for race to be considered in a university’s admissions process, 
the admissions policies must survive strict scrutiny.36 The Court noted 
that narrow tailoring “requires a reviewing court to verify that it is 
‘necessary’ for the university to use race to achieve the educational 
benefits of diversity.”37 The Court further concluded that “[t]he 
reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-
neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of 
diversity.”38 
In Fisher I, the Supreme Court disagreed with the rationale 
employed by the Appellate Court regarding deference to the 
University, and overturned the prior decision because the lower courts 
did not apply the correct standard of strict scrutiny.39 The Supreme 
Court held that the strict scrutiny inquiry employed by the lower courts 
was too narrow in its deference to the University’s supposed “good 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 2420. The court presumed the University had “acted in good faith” and placed the 
burden of rebutting that presumption on Fisher. By doing so, the court considered the narrow-
tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny with a degree of deference to the University. Id. 
 34. Id. at 2417. 
 35. Id. at 2415. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 2414; see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978) (holding that, 
“in order to justify the use of a suspect classification, [the government] must show that . . . its use 
of the classification is necessary” to achieving a compelling government purpose or safeguarding 
a compelling government interest). 
 38. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2414. 
 39. Id. at 2421. 
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faith” in its use of racial classifications.40 The Supreme Court held that 
it was the duty of the courts to actually verify that the means the 
University chose to attain diversity were necessary to achieve the 
benefits of diversity and find that there was no race-neutral alternative 
available that would provide the same benefits.41 The Court ruled that 
the lower courts did not conduct an examination that was sufficient 
under strict scrutiny.42 It remanded and ordered the lower court to 
perform a searching examination of the University’s admissions 
process to “assess whether the University has offered sufficient 
evidence [to] prove that its admissions program is narrowly tailored to 
obtain the educational benefits of diversity.”43 
In addition, the Supreme Court concluded that strict scrutiny did 
not permit a court to simply accept at face value a University’s claim 
that its admissions policy used race in a permissible way.44 The Court 
held that any reviewing court must give “close analysis to the 
evidence” provided by the university of how the use of race in its 
admissions policy “works in practice.”45 The Court held that once a 
university has “established that its goal of diversity is consistent with 
strict scrutiny” there must still be “a further judicial determination that 
the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its implementation.”46 
The Court further explained that “[T]he University must prove that the 
means chosen by the University to attain diversity are narrowly 
tailored to that goal” and specified that, “[o]n this point, the University 
receives no deference.”47 
Prior to Fisher I, the Supreme Court upheld the use of race as one 
of many factors in a higher education admission program that 
holistically examined the overall contribution of individual 
applicants.48 However, the Supreme Court had also held that an 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 2421. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 2419–20 (emphasis added). 
 47. Id. at 2420. 
 48. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that a law school admissions 
program that considered race and ethnicity as a factor affecting diversity did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause because such an admissions policy satisfied strict scrutiny. Reasoning that the 
admissions policy constituted a narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further the 
law school’s compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that stem from diversity). 
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admissions policy that awarded points to applicants from certain racial 
minorities was unconstitutional.49 
2.  Fisher’s Second Journey to the Supreme Court 
In Fisher II, the Supreme Court held that the University’s race-
conscious admissions policy was narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest and thus survived strict scrutiny.50 The Court 
looked to precedent that had established educational diversity as a 
compelling interest so long as there was a concrete goal that was 
neither a “fixed quota” nor a “specified percentage” of a particular 
racial group.51 In reaching its conclusion, the Court acknowledged that 
“a university may institute a race-conscious admissions program as a 
means of obtaining ‘the educational benefits that flow from student 
body diversity.’”52 
However, the Court noted that “asserting an interest in the 
educational benefits of diversity writ large is insufficient.”53 The Court 
noted that, “[a] university’s goals cannot be elusory or amorphous—
they must be sufficiently measurable to permit judicial scrutiny of the 
policies adopted to reach them.”54 In applying this rule to the 
University, the Court reasoned that the University had not merely cited 
the general goal of diversity but rather had “articulated concrete and 
precise goals” such as “the destruction of stereotypes, the ‘promo[tion 
of] cross-racial understanding,’ the preparation of a student body for 
‘an increasingly diverse workforce and society,’ and the ‘cultivat[ion 
of] a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.’”55 The 
court reasoned that such concrete goals “mirror the compelling interest 
this Court has approved in prior cases” and concluded that the 
compelling government interest prong of strict scrutiny was met.56 
The Court further concluded that the University met the narrow 
tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny because the University pointed 
to empirical data showing that there were no other workable 
 
 49. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273–76 (2003) (holding that a university’s policy of 
automatically giving twenty points to applicants who were members of an underrepresented 
minority solely due to the applicant’s race was not narrowly tailored to achieve diversity). 
 50. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016). 
 51. Id. at 2208. 
 52. Id. at 2210. 
 53. Id. at 2211. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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alternatives for attaining its diversity goals.57 In concluding that the 
University met the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny, the Court 
reasoned that empirical data, including a year-long study conducted 
by the University, “revealed that its race-neutral policies and programs 
did not meet its goals.”58 
The Court reasoned that the University’s conclusion that race-
neutral admissions policies were ineffective in achieving the 
University’s diversity goals was supported by significant statistical 
and anecdotal evidence.59 For example, the Court noted that a 
University study revealed that, “in 2002, 52% of undergraduate 
classes with at least five students had no African-American students 
enrolled in them, and 27% had only one African-American student.”60 
The Court reasoned that although a university “must continually 
reassess its need for race-conscious review, here that assessment 
appears to have been done with care, and a reasonable determination 
was made that the University had not yet attained its goals.”61 The 
Court ultimately concluded that due to the empirical evidence 
indicating lack of diversity, the University had a “reasoned, principled 
explanation” for adopting an admissions policy that considers an 
applicant’s race as one factor of the applicant’s Personal Achievement 
Index score.62 
Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, heavily criticizes the majority’s 
conclusion.63 In addition to joining Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, 
Justice Thomas wrote separately to reaffirm that “a State’s use of race 
in higher education admissions decisions is categorically prohibited 
by the Equal Protection Clause” and that “[t]he Constitution abhors 
classifications based on race because every time the government 
places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the 
provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”64 
The dissent written by Justice Alito reasons that the University 
had not “identified with any degree of specificity the interests that its 
 
 57. Id. at 2212. 
 58. Id. at 2211. 
 59. Id. at 2212. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 2211. 
 63. Id. at 2215–17 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. at 2215 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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use of race and ethnicity is supposed to serve,” and thus did not meet 
the demanding standard of strict scrutiny.65 The dissent notes that the 
University’s primary argument was that “the educational benefits of 
diversity” is a specific interest and that the University “need not 
identify any metric that would allow a court to determine whether its 
plan is needed to serve, or is actually serving, those interests.”66 The 
dissent analogizes the majority’s acceptance of the University’s 
generic purpose of attaining the “educational benefits of diversity” to 
the court giving deference to the University (a practice that was 
rejected by the Supreme Court’s holding in Fisher I).67 
Justice Alito reasoned that although the University argued it 
adopted a race-conscious admissions policy in order to promote 
classroom diversity, the University had not shown that its admissions 
policy did in fact increase classroom diversity.68 In addition, the 
dissent criticized the University for arguing that it lacked a “critical 
mass” of minority students without ever defining the term “critical 
mass.”69 Justice Alito notes that “[a]ccording to [the University], a 
critical mass is neither some absolute number of African-American or 
Hispanic students nor the percentage of African-Americans or 
Hispanics in the general population of the State.”70 The dissenting 
Justices reason that accepting this type of generic and undefined goal 
is akin to giving deference to the University.71 The dissent further 
notes that to the extent that the University is aiming to diversify their 
incoming class to achieve harmony with Texas demographics of 
minority populations, such an act constitutes an “outright racial 
balancing” that has unequivocally been held as unconstitutional.72 
The dissent further reasons that the University’s admission policy 
does not meet the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny.73 
Justice Alito argues that even if the University is “truly seeking to 
expose its students to a diversity of ideas and perspectives,” the race-
 
 65. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.; Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. (holding that the strict scrutiny inquiry employed by the 
Appellate Court was too narrow in its deference to the university’s supposed “good faith” in its use 
of racial classifications). 
 68. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2225. 
 73. Id. at 2227. 
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conscious admissions process is poorly tailored to serve that interest.74 
To make that point,75 Justice Alito points to the University’s own 
study of Asian-American students, “which the majority touts as the 
best ‘nuanced quantitative data’ supporting UT’s position” and notes 
that it demonstrated that “classroom diversity was more lacking for 
students classified as Asian-American than for those classified as 
Hispanic.”76 Justice Alito argued that the University’s plan actually 
discriminates against Asian-American students.77 Justice Alito 
justified his argument by reasoning that the University’s race-
conscious admissions policy is “clearly designed to increase the 
number of African-American and Hispanic students by giving them an 
admissions boost vis-à-vis other applicants.”78 Justice Alito further 
argued that, “[g]iven [the] ‘limited number of spaces,’ providing a 
boost to African-Americans and Hispanics inevitably harms students 
who do not receive the same boost by decreasing their odds of 
admission.”79 
Justice Alito also criticized the majority for “completely 
ignor[ing] [the University’s] finding that Hispanics are better 
represented than Asian-Americans in classrooms” and reasons that the 
majority’s holding demonstrates the notion that the University “can 
pick and choose which racial and ethnic groups it would like to 
favor.”80 The dissenting justices brought their argument full circle in 
reasoning that, “unless the University is engaged in unconstitutional 
racial balancing based on Texas demographics (where Hispanics 
outnumber Asian-Americans), it seemingly views the classroom 
contributions of Asian-American students as less valuable than those 
of Hispanic students.”81 The dissent ultimately concludes that the 
University did not meet either prong of the heavy burden of strict 
scrutiny and heavily criticizes the majority’s conclusion, stating that 
the holding was “remarkably wrong.”82 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 2227 n.4. 
 79. Id. (citation omitted). 
 80. Id. at 2227–28. 
 81. Id. at 2227 (citation omitted). 
 82. Id. at 2243. 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
While Justice Alito’s dissent constitutes a passionate plea for 
those that believe the majority granted too much deference to the 
University in its holding, legal precedent supports the conclusion of 
the majority that the University’s race-conscious admissions policy 
survives strict scrutiny. The dissent points out that the University 
failed to define the term “critical mass” with clarity and reasons that 
without knowing specifically how a “critical mass” of minority 
students can be measured, a reviewing court would not be able to 
examine whether the use of race would be necessary to meet that 
goal.83 However, this reasoning is flawed. Well-established case law 
prohibits the use of numbers or quotas for minority student admission 
in universities.84 In addition, Justice Alito’s argument that the 
University’s race-conscious admissions policy provides a “boost to 
African-Americans and Hispanics”85 that harms other students by 
“decreasing their odds of admission”86 finds no support in legal 
precedent regarding the burden of strict scrutiny. Accepting this kind 
of reasoning would merely serve to blur the line between arguments 
emerging from established legal precedent and passionate rhetoric 
aiming to persuade the masses. 
However, a careful examination of the holding in Fisher II lends 
support to the notion that the Court’s decision leaves the door open for 
future challenges. Ultimately, the holding in Fisher II is a far cry from 
the unequivocal upholding of “affirmative action” in college 
admissions that many national headlines jumped to proclaim.87 Justice 
Kennedy examined the University’s race-conscious admissions policy 
with a strict application of the narrow tailoring prong and his reasoning 
 
 83. Id. at 2222. 
 84. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (“To be narrowly tailored, a race-
conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system.”). 
 85. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2222 n.4. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Upholds Affirmative Action in College Admissions, 
NPR (June 23, 2016, 4:31 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/06/23/483275212/supreme-court-
upholds-affirmative-action-in-college-admissions; Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Upholds 
Affirmative Action in University Admissions, USA TODAY (June 23, 2016, 5:36 PM), http://www. 
usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/06/23/supreme-court-university-texas-affirmative-action-
race/83239790; Jess Bravin & Brent Kendall, Supreme Court Upholds Affirmative Action in 
University Admissions, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-
upholds-affirmative-action-in-university-admissions-1466691615. 
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was firmly based on records and data.88 A strong argument against the 
use of a race-conscious admissions policy as a means of achieving the 
various benefits of diversity is that such an outcome can be achieved 
by other means. Justice Kennedy reasoned that the narrow tailoring 
requirement of strict scrutiny was met because the University used 
extensive evidence to show that there were no race-neutral alternatives 
available.89 The Court specifically reasoned that a review of the record 
revealed that none of Fisher’s “suggested alternatives—nor other 
proposals considered or discussed in the course” of litigation 
constituted a “‘available’ and ‘workable’” alternative by which the 
University could attain its “educational goals.”90 
Fisher II ceases to be a one size fits all interpretation of the equal 
protection clause as it pertains to the use of race in university 
admissions. The Court made it clear that the holding was based on the 
specific set of circumstances present in the case, and even noted that 
the constitutionality of the University’s admission policy must be 
reassessed in the future “in light of the experience the school has 
accumulated and the data it has gathered since the adoption of its 
admissions plan.”91 The Court noted that the University has a 
“continuing obligation to satisfy the burden of strict scrutiny in light 
of changing circumstances.”92 With respect to the narrow tailoring 
prong of strict scrutiny, the Court pointed to the extensive evidence 
the University presented regarding race neutral alternatives.93 The 
Court’s imperative use of the type of critical records and data that 
would range widely from university to university delineates how fact 
specific the narrow tailoring consideration is. Such a fact specific 
consideration inherently leaves the door open for future challenges. 
This is exemplified by Justice Kennedy’s consideration of 
Fisher’s suggestion that one alternative mean by which the University 
could attain its diversity goals may be to “intensify its outreach efforts 
to African-American and Hispanic applicants.”94 Justice Kennedy 
pointed to the fact that the University submitted “extensive evidence 
 
 88. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2211–14; See, e.g., 2212 (“The record itself contains significant 
evidence, both statistical and anecdotal, in support of the University’s position.”). 
 89. Id. at 2214. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 2209–10. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 2212–13. 
 94. Id. 
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of the many ways in which it already had intensified its outreach 
efforts to those students.”95 Specifically, the University had submitted 
evidence that it had created several new scholarship programs, 
“opened new regional admissions centers, increased its recruitment 
budget by half-a-million dollars, and organized over 1,000 recruitment 
events.”96 Justice Kennedy specifically pointed to the fact that the 
University “spent seven years attempting to achieve its compelling 
interest using race-neutral holistic review” but “none of these efforts 
succeeded.”97 Such university-specific facts and considerations cannot 
be stretched to fit across the board to various universities across our 
nation. When such specific considerations are employed, even a slight 
variation in facts and circumstances at another university may tip the 
balance in favor of a ruling that strict scrutiny was not met.98 
The Court emphasized that the University’s admissions process 
was both unique and complex, and that the set of circumstances 
creating the backdrop of Fisher II may limit the case’s value for 
“prospective guidance.”99 Fundamentally, Texas’s unique Top Ten 
Percent Law played an important role in the diversity of the 
University. Approximately 75% of admitted students are comprised of 
students granted admission through the Top Ten Percent Law as 
opposed to the traditional application process.100 As a result of this 
unique circumstance, the Court reasoned that even if the Top Ten 
Percent Law increased minority enrollment as a matter of raw 
numbers, such an “approach would sacrifice all other aspects of 
diversity” as it would “exclude the star athlete or musician whose 
grades suffered because of daily practices and training” or the 
“talented young biologist who struggled to maintain above-average 
grades in humanities classes.”101 Justice Kennedy reasoned that “class 
rank is a single metric, and like any single metric, it will capture 
certain types of people and miss others.”102 The Top Ten Percent Law 
is fundamentally at odds with the goal of educational diversity as 
 
 95. Id. at 2213. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 2209 (“The fact that this case has been litigated on a somewhat artificial basis, 
furthermore, may limit its value for prospective guidance.”). 
 100. Id. at 2202. 
 101. Id. at 2213 (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. 
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defined by past precedent.103 The Top Ten Percent Law created a 
situation in which a majority of the University’s entering class was 
essentially admitted based on a single metric (class rank) and thus 
compromised the very diversity the University sought. This led to an 
increased need for the University to be able to utilize its holistic 
admissions policy to attain the diversity it sought in the remaining 
25% of the class. 
The narrow nature of the Court’s decision is further highlighted 
by Justice Kennedy’s statement that “[t]he Court’s affirmance of the 
University’s admissions policy today does not necessarily mean the 
University may rely on that same policy without refinement.”104 In 
holding that “[i]t is the University’s ongoing obligation to engage in 
constant deliberation and continued reflection regarding its 
admissions policies,”105 the Court indicates that the ruling regarding 
the constitutionality of the University’s current admission policy itself 
may turn out differently in the future should enrollment data and 
statistics shift. This consideration denotes the volatility of the Court’s 
own decision, highlighting the notion that even the same policy may 
become unconstitutional as circumstances and data regarding students 
change. 
Moreover, under the University’s admissions policy race is 
merely a “factor of a factor of a factor,” as it is one of many 
considerations examined when assessing an applicant’s Personal 
Achievement Index.106 Under the University’s admissions policy, the 
consideration of race does not “operate as a mechanical plus factor for 
underrepresented minorities.”107 Thus any university that considered 
race as more than merely a factor of a factor in its admissions process 
would likely face an uphill battle in meeting the narrow tailoring prong 
of strict scrutiny. 
Going forward, if a university wishes to use race as a factor in its 
admissions process, it cannot rely on the general goal of merely 
 
 103. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003) (noting that admissions policies that 
include percentage plans might preclude universities from “conducting the individualized 
assessments necessary” to attain a truly diverse student body). 
 104. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 2207 (“[A]lthough admissions officers can consider race as a positive feature of a 
minority student’s application, there is no dispute that race is but a ‘factor of a factor of a factor’ in 
the holistic-review calculus. Furthermore, consideration of race is contextual and does not operate 
as a mechanical plus factor for underrepresented minorities.” (citation omitted)). 
 107. Id. 
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increasing diversity, but rather, would likely need to prove a 
deficiency in diversity and point to specific goals that courts have the 
ability to measure.108 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Considering Justice Kennedy’s past stance on affirmative action 
cases, it may be surprising to some that he decided in favor of 
upholding a race-conscious admissions policy, and went on to author 
the Court’s opinion. Prior to Fisher II, Justice Kennedy had never 
voted to support an affirmative action policy.109 In fact, in Grutter, 
Justice Kennedy wrote a scathing dissent that went so far as to state 
that the majority’s acceptance of the University of Michigan Law 
School’s admissions policies was “nothing short of perfunctory” and 
that “the concept of critical mass” was a “delusion used by the Law 
School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most 
instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from 
quotas.”110 
However, Justice Kennedy’s change in stance is an example of 
the notion that as society evolves and circumstances change, so too 
can the opinions of Supreme Court Justices. Should future challenges 
to race-conscious university admissions policies arise, there may 
easily be a new Justice on the Supreme Court whose outlook diverges 
from that of the majority in Fisher II. 
While the holding in Fisher II was groundbreaking in its own 
right, the holding of the court is inextricable from the specific 
circumstances and factors that played a role in the Court’s reasoning. 
For this reason, the holding in Fisher II falls short of an unequivocal 
upholding of the constitutionality of race-conscious university 
admissions policies across the board. Fisher II leaves the door open to 
new challenges, and possibly different outcomes, to race-conscious 
university admissions policies moving forward. 
 
 
 
 108. Id. at 2211–12. 
 109. Daniel Fisher, Justice Kennedy Evolves from Affirmative Action Skeptic to Supporter with 
Texas Case, FORBES (June 23, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2016/06/23/justice 
-kennedy-evolves-from-affirmative-action-skeptic-to-supporter-with-texas-case/#45afa8af53ef 
(“Kennedy’s opinion is all the more surprising since he had never before voted in favor of race-
based preferences . . .”). 
 110. See Grutter, 539 U.S at 388–89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
50.2_SAFARI_V.9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/11/18  9:10 PM 
284 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:269 
 
